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About 80 percent of the world population currently lives 
in countries that are either developed or developing. The 
other 20 percent lives in countries that are stagnant or 
falling behind. As a result, by the 2015 target date for 
the Millennium Development Goals, about one billion 
people will still live in severe poverty. Some of these 
people will live in countries that are stuck in one or more 
development traps; others will live in poor, remote, and 
backward areas of countries experiencing economic 
growth, on average. While it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to reduce income poverty under those 
circumstances, other aspects of poverty—particularly 
bad health and premature death—can be reduced.  
  This brief focuses on options for increasing the 
chances that the billion at the bottom of the global 
income distribution will have access to affordable health 
care. The discussion draws on some long-standing 
regularities in health economics and new developments 
in the design and implementation of low-cost health 
insurance for low-income people in developing countries. 
It shows why private finance for health care will 
continue to play a major role, especially in poor 
countries, and argues that increased coverage of 
voluntary, private health insurance can be a suitable 
way of securing high-quality health care for the poor. 
The First Law of Health Economics  
The tight relationship between per capita health 
expenditures and gross domestic product (GDP) is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The cross-country regression is 
based on 176 observations for 2004. Other than for the 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, which show a slightly higher income 
elasticity, tests for regional effects are all negative. The 
fit of this simple regression is very tight (the R-squared 
is 0.954), which leaves little room for issues such as fee-
for-service versus capitation systems, global budget caps 
(for hospitals), public versus private financing, and—
most importantly for the purpose of this discussion—
foreign aid and debt relief to have an additional impact 
on the overall financial resources available for health 
care within a country. (Health expenditures per capita 
increase 0.07 percent for every 1 percent increase in 
foreign aid; the standard error is 0.042.) 
  Why is per capita health expenditure so closely 
related to GDP per capita? One would expect that, in 
Figure 1. The First Law of Health Economics 
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Source: World Health Organization, Statistical Information System 
<http://www.who.int/whosis/en/index.html> (accessed 2004). 
countries where governments give high priority to health 
care, overall spending would be relatively high, given 
GDP per capita—unless, of course, private financing for 
health care is being reduced as a result. This crowding-
out phenomenon can also be at work when foreign aid 
for health care is increased, thus allowing governments, 
or the private sector, to spend less of their own 
resources. Whatever the mechanism, when GDP per 
capita is known, health expenditures per capita can be 
predicted with more than 95 percent accuracy.  
  A second common observation is that in low-income 
countries, private, not-insured, out-of-pocket 
expenditures on health care make up a larger share of 
total financial resources than in richer countries (Figure 
2). In many low-income countries the share exceeds 50 
percent; in India and China it is over 75 percent. 
However, the R-squared for this regression is only 
0.311, leaving plenty of scope for policy measures to 
reduce the out-of-pocket share, especially through the 
implementation of health insurance. Risk sharing for 
health care is critical to efforts to alleviate poverty. A 
recent study shows that about 150 million people per 
year suffer catastrophic financial shocks due to 
uninsured health care expenditures. 
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Figure 2. The Share of Out-of-Pocket 
Expenditures Decreases with Development 
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Source: World Health Organization, Statistical Information System 
<http://www.who.int/whosis/en/index.html> (accessed 2004). 
  These two observations prompt the conclusions that 
in low-income countries total future resources for health 
care will be small, and a large share will consist of 
private, out-of-pocket expenditures. Conventional efforts 
to increase health resources will not change this. The 
main challenges are to increase overall resources 
without crowding out existing private resources and to 
increase risk sharing for poor households. 
Poor Pockets in Growing Countries 
By 2015, a large number of the world’s poor will live in 
poor, remote areas of what will by then be middle-
income countries. For these countries, the problem will 
not be a question of sufficient resources for health care 
but of how those resources are being distributed. 
Equality in health has been high on the international 
policy agenda for decades, but it proves to be an illusive 
goal. Virtually without exception, country studies show 
that the poor have less access to all types of health care 
and benefit less from publicly provided services than do 
higher income groups. Thus, health status is universally 
lower for the poor than for the rich. The quest for health 
equality is often used as a major argument for heavy 
government involvement in health care. After more than 
25 years of policy failure in this area, evidence suggests 
it is time to rethink reliance on the government as sole 
financier/provider of health care.  
  Colombia provides a good example on how progress 
can be made to achieve access for all. It introduced a 
comprehensive health insurance scheme in the early 
1980s consisting of two regimes: a contributory regime 
focusing on workers with monthly incomes of about 
US$170 or higher and a subsidized regime for the poor. 
The contributory regime is financed through mandatory 
payroll taxes and the subsidized regime from a mixture 
of fiscal revenues and cross-subsidies from payroll taxes. 
A controversial but necessary aspect of the dual 
insurance scheme is that benefits are more limited in the 
subsidized regime, reducing the requirement of equality. 
Paradoxically, the overall effect of the introduction of the 
new system has been more equality in insurance 
coverage, access to health care, and health outcomes. 
  Further, even for the fully subsidized regime, the 
government has not solely relied on the public sector; 
instead, participants choose from among a mixture of 
public or private, for-profit or not-for-profit health 
insurance companies. In turn, the insurance companies 
contract health services from a network of public, 
private, or own clinics and hospitals. This supply aspect 
is often overlooked when discussing the feasibility of 
providing access to health services for the poor through 
low-cost health insurance. In many developing countries 
governments promise free health care for all but fail in 
the delivery. As part of the public sector, health staff 
often go unpaid for months, clinics lack drugs and 
equipment, and hospitals become dilapidated from lack 
of maintenance. The insurer–provider contracts provide 
for a steady and reliable income flow for clinics and 
hospitals, which facilitates sufficient staffing and much-
needed investment in health care infrastructure. The 
Colombian experience suggests that health insurance 
coverage for all can be achieved in middle-income 
countries provided that a number of lessons are taken to 
heart: first, the goal of ex ante equality is an 
impediment to providing access for all. The global 
evidence on that is overwhelming. Second, higher levels 
of ex post equality can be achieved if coverage levels for 
the poor take the realistic view that resources are 
limited. And finally, by relying on insurer–provider 
contracts—where the providers can be public or 
private—incentives can be put in place to provide 
reliable access for all income levels. 
Financing Health Care in Poor Countries 
Financing health care in poor countries that have limited 
or no growth prospects remains challenging. But here 
too health insurance can play a major role. As shown 
above, the share of private payment for health care is 
large in poor countries. Given the overall limitations of 
resources, policies to increase access should be 
designed so as not to crowd out those private resources. 
Prepaid, low-cost voluntary health insurance provides 
such a mechanism. It harnesses the existing resources, 
provides a steady income flow for the providers, and 
protects participants from financial shocks as a result of 
illness. Recent experience in a number of African 
countries suggests a way forward.  
  The Dutch nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
PharmAccess develops low-income health insurance 
products for a variety of low-income workers. The NGO 
started with workplace programs in large international 
companies, providing comprehensive health insurance 
for the workers, including counseling and treatment 
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and malaria. As in the case of Colombia, PharmAccess 
develops contracts between insurers and providers to 
guarantee easily accessible and high-quality care. This 
approach is currently being implemented in more than 
30 African countries. The major challenge now is not 
only to provide insurance coverage to workers at large 
and often international companies, but also to increase 
coverage for workers in small and local companies and 
for the self-employed. Pilot projects of this kind are 
being developed and implemented in Namibia, Nigeria, 
and Tanzania. The schemes provide an easy mechanism 
for donor support to subsidize the insurance premiums, 
without risking the crowding out of existing public or 
private resources. Group insurances are developed for 
farmer cooperations, participants of microfinance 
schemes, market women, fishermen cooperations, small 
information and communications technology enterprises, 
organized coffee growers, and other target groups. In all 
cases the benefit levels are tailored to the needs (and 
means) of the target groups. With the aid of a generous 
grant from the Dutch government, insurance premiums 
are subsidized for the first few years to entice low-
income households to participate in these new schemes. 
The steady income flow from these prepaid schemes 
allows providers to invest in improvements of health 
care infrastructure. 
  Of course, the success of this approach depends on 
the effective and sustained demand for these voluntary 
(private) prepaid insurance schemes. Long-term 
experience with such schemes is still limited, but a 
growing literature on the willingness to pay for health 
insurance suggests that the market for such schemes is 
large, also among the poor. 
The Willingness to Pay for Health Insurance 
In the absence of real world experience, economists 
gauge the willingness to pay (WTP) for health insurance 
in low-income countries by means of contingent 
valuation (CV) methods. The number of studies in this 
area is rapidly growing and provides a consistent 
picture. One study by Barnighausen et al. examines 
WTP among informal-sector workers in Wuhan, China, 
finding that these workers are willing to pay the 
equivalent of about US$4 per member per month. This 
amount is higher than the estimated cost of insurance 
based on past health expenditures. Another study by 
Dror et al. uses unidirectional bidding in a CV survey to 
obtain estimates of willingness to pay for health 
insurance in India, finding that the poor are willing to 
pay a higher percentage of their income on health 
insurance premiums than higher income groups. The 
median WTP for health insurance is the equivalent of 
about US$15, and 25 percent of the respondents are 
willing to pay the equivalent of US$20 or more. Asgary 
et al. examine willingness to pay for health insurance in 
rural Iran, finding that households are willing to pay 
US$2.77 per month on average. Asfaw and von Braun 
estimate that, on average, the willingness to pay for a 
community-based health insurance scheme in Ethiopia is 
the equivalent of about US$0.60 per month, pointing out 
on page 249 that, while this amount seems small, “if 
universal coverage of insurance is assumed, it is possible 
to generate around 631 million Birr (US$75 million) per 
annum from 1.57 million urban and 9.5 million rural 
households of the country. This amount is much higher 
than the maximum amount of money used as a 
recurrent budget by the health sector of the country.” 
  A recent study for Namibia reports the results 
presented in Table 1. Using the CV method, the authors 
estimate that households in the poorest quintile are 
willing to pay the equivalent of about US$18.50, or 5 
percent of their income, on health insurance. 
Remarkably, this is almost exactly the expected amount 
of their current expenditure level. Higher income 
households are willing to pay more for insurance, again 
reflecting their expected outlays
 (for the highest income 
group, the WTP is much lower than their expected 
expenditures, probably due to the limited coverage of 
the hypothetical insurance package that was offered). 
Table 1. Mean Willingness to Pay for Health 
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Quintile N$ N$ % 
1 130  132  4.97 
2 162  180  3.07 
3 215  204  1.96 
4 324  264  1.31 
5 902  312  0.47 
Total 283  252  1.20 
Source: Calculated by author based on Republic of Namibia 
Okambilimbili Survey, 2006, and A. Asfaw, E. Gustafsson-Wright, 
and J. van der Gaag, "Willingness to Pay for Health Insurance: An 
Analysis of the Potential Market for Health Insurance in Namibia," 
(Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2007). 
Experience with Community Health  
Insurance Programs 
Voluntary health insurance schemes have long been 
around in developing countries. Unfortunately, the 
experiences with such schemes are mixed and hard 
analyses into the causes of these mixed results are 
scarce. Based on an extensive survey of the literature, 
Preker et al. conclude that there is good evidence that 
community financing arrangements lead to better access 
to drugs, primary care, and even hospital care, but they 
also find that many schemes have difficulties in raising 
sufficient resources. Implementation problems are also 
mentioned in a report from the Ministry of Health in 
Tanzania that discusses experiences with community 
health insurance schemes in Tanzania, Zanzibar, 
Uganda, and Ghana. In particular, the need to introduce 
user fees (to entice participation in the insurance   4 
scheme) and to design a system of exemptions (for 
instance, for pregnant women) and waivers (for the very 
poor) proved to be major obstacles for the successful 
implementation of such schemes. Wagstaff et al. find 
that the introduction of a heavily subsidized voluntary 
health insurance scheme in rural China did increase 
outpatient and inpatient utilization by 20 to 30 percent 
but had no impact on out-of-pocket spending or 
utilization among the poor. 
  It is worth noting that none of these studies 
analyzes or even describes the link of the insurance 
schemes with health care providers. The current 
evidence suggests that for such schemes to be 
successful, more experience is necessary with 
alternative forms of implementation, including effective 
insurance provider contracts.  
  The sustainability question for these types of 
schemes is not different from the sustainability question 
regarding budget support for public systems. For low-
income countries, additional resources to provide free or 
highly subsidized public health care will be necessary for 
years to come. The same is likely to be true for prepaid 
health insurance schemes for low-income households. 
The main difference is that the prepaid schemes 
leverage the already available private resources and 
thereby empower low-income households to demand 
easily accessible quality care. Furthermore, the prepaid 
schemes can contract out services with both public and 
private providers, thus contributing to the development 
of a more integrated overall health care system. 
Conclusion  
In poor, nongrowing countries, and in poor pockets of 
countries that are developing, resources for health care 
will be scarce and a large proportion of those resources 
will be private. Donor aid for the first group of countries, 
and central government aid for the poor in the second 
group, should be designed in such a way that the 
private resources stay in the health system, rather than 
being crowded out. Private, voluntary health insurance 
may provide a mechanism to achieve this. It will also 
provide a reliable income flow for health care providers 
and protect the poor against the negative financial shock 
of having to face large health care expenditures. 
Potentially, the demand for suitably designed low-cost 
private health insurance is large, even among the poor. 
The main challenge is to design insurer–provider 
contracts that guarantee reliable and easy access to 
high-quality care. Experience with such contractual 
arrangements is scarce. The way forward should include 
experimentation with alternative contractual 
arrangements among (public and private) insurers and 
(public and private) providers, accompanied by serious 
evaluation efforts to learn from mistakes and 
accumulate best practices.  
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